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ABSTRACT 
This thesis att empts to justify a Skinneric.n 
interpretation of intel l i eence . The justific~tion has 
t hree major t he mes. Firstly it is arQled th~t 
Skinnerian beh &viourism has the status of scientific 
knouledge corn.parable to 1.Je,, tonian r,1echanics . Se condl y 
it i ~ a r gued tha t Gtenhouoe ' s e t holocicnl theory of 
intelligence has a number of defe cts , so t}1at a 
behaviouri s t t heory which reta ins the strengths of t he 
etho loc ic 2.l theory while avoidine t hose de f ec t s i s to be 
preferred . Thirdly it i s argued t hat cert2.in \·: i <ie ly 
received a ccounts of scientific knowl edge are mistaken ; 
o.n alte rn2.t i ve [.,Ccount is pr esented . 'rhis venture into 
philosophy of science underlies t he other two theoes 
~nd is presented first . 
The supposition that sci ence may be represented i n 
t er r:::1s of gener a l l aus of t l:e foro ' i,11 swans nre white ' 
i s critically e xanined , followi nG Toul mi n ' s analys i s 
i:.1h ich is i llustrated with thre e exeopl ar s of s cienti f ic 
knoul edge . 
£ Galil ean ideal of science is then e l aborated . 
The idec.l is formulat ed in terns of scientific knoi·rl edge 
follow i ng Toulmin, and illustrated with three exemplars 
of sc i entific knoi;.1ledge . The proce sses of revolutionary 
science , normal science , t echnology , and justification 
of t heories , are interpre ted in terms of t he ideal 
a lluded to 2.bove with further illustn.;.tions. Converg-
ences with de Bono' s 'la teral thinking ' are suggested . 
Criticisms of s t at istical ' social s cience ' a re noted . 
The conventional contrast betwee n physical and social 
science is critica l ly exc.rnined . 
A formulation of Ski nnerian behaviourism is 
pre sented , to demonstrate tha t behaviourism conforms 
to t he Galilean ideal of science . Various criticisms 
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of behaviourism are responded to. The proposed criteria 
for justificction of theories are applied to behaviourism . 
Stenhouse ' s ethological theory of the nature and 
evolution of intelligence i s criticially examined . The 
d ivergent development of e t hology ru1d behaviourism from 
reflexoloe;y i s outlined. . Skinner ' s critique of P2.vlov ' s 
concept 'inhibition ' is appl ied to Stenhou se's ' P-factor'. 
The use of metaphors in science i s discussed . De 
Bono ' s ' special mel.:lory sur·fL:.ce ' is noted as 8l1 alterna tive 
to the usua l r:iechanical or ele ctronic storage systems a s 
a metaphor for memo ry . 
Skinner ' s anal ysis of the n s.ture and evolution of 
intelligence is elabor~ted . Stenhouse ' s f 2ctors and 
especially the F- factor ~re re interpreted in behaviourist 
teros . It i s 2,rgued t hat a behavi ourist theory of 
intelligence is preferable to Stenhouse ' s ethological 
theory in te rms of the Galile an i deal of s cience. 
Educational and political implic a t i ons of vo..rious 
philosophical and theoretic al positions are also noted. 
PREFACE 
\lhile this t hesis is organised around and 
concludes with a behaviouri s t reinte r preta.tion of 
Stenhouse ' s theory of intelligence , that reinterpretat i on 
is confined to one final chapter . The preceding four 
chapters discuss various i ssues as listed in t he 
Abs tract (principally in the phil osophy of science both 
generally and as applied to beh2.viourism and ethol ogy) , 
which may be of wider interest apart from the support 
they give to the final chapter . 
The existing treatments of the se issues vary : 
sone are mere ly infornal a nd fraeraent ary, some while 
substo..ntial h 2.ve been neGlected by r:i.ore recent writers , 
and s ome expre s s what I wi ll argue are seriousl y 
r.1islea6.ing vieHs o.s to the n~ture of science . In view 
of this s itu a tion it seemed necessary to discuss some of 
those i ssues a t leneth in order t o clarify and defend 
the presuppositions of the final chapter; other related 
i ssues are d i scussed briefly by wa y of d i gress i ons . At 
bes t those first four chapters may contain some 
subs t antia l contribut ion on one or two i ssues in the 
philosophy of science ; however fai ling t hat the 
bibliogra phy and page- siecific references may still 
prove useful . 
Ferhaps the most prominent of those i ssues, bo t h 
within t h is thesis and a t large , i s the scientific status 
of behaviourism . Thus the short title 'In defence of 
behaviourism ', while not reflecting the structure or 
conclusion, does indicate a major theme of some wider 
interest . 
Certa in key terms may conve niently be elaborat ed 
at this po i nt. 
' Behaviourism ' , and hence ' behaviouri s t•, re fer 
here to the science of behaviour developed by 
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B.F. Skinner and outlined in Chapter 3. This usage 
differs from that of Skinner (1974), who used the term 
'behaviourism' to refer to the phil osophy of that 
science. In this thesis the philosophy of behaviourism 
is considered to be -part of the philosophy of science in 
g eneral. 
'Science' refers to the tradition identified with 
Galileo, Newton , ~endel, Darwin and many others. It is 
a complex behavioural phenomenon, in s ome aspects 
comparable with a nd merging int o myths (Feyerabend 1961; 
1975) and common idiom (cf Toulmin 1953 :39 on certain 
metaphors as the ghosts of de ad theories). While it 
would be difficult to gain assent to a ny strict definition 
of science, particula.r works identified with particula r 
p ers ons (eg . Newtonian mechanics) may g enerally be 
a ccepted as exempl8.rs of science from which an ideal form 
of science may be abst r acted. A theory may be said to 
be ' sc ient ific' t o the extent that it conforms to such an 
idea l. Science may be analysed into p roducts a nd 
p rocesses. In Chanter 2 there a re identified the 
products ' primar y knowledge' and ' secondary know l edee ', 
and the proces ses 'revolutionary s ci ence', 'norma l 
science', 'technology' a.nd 'just i f ication o:f theories'. 
Likewi s e the term 't echnoloJ y' is not r estricted 
to the applicat ions of physic a l sciences t o the des i gn of 
hardware; the term is us ed to refer to t he appl ic ation 
of any s ci entific theory to any practical probl em . For 
instance, a.n ap~lica.tion of behaviourism to the solution 
of instruc t ional problems in schools, regqrdless of 
v; hether or not 2.ny gadg etry or even numerical measurement 
are involved, counts as technology in this sense. 
A 'theory' is a coherent body of (justified or 
hy pothesised) primary knowledge, together with its 
associated secondary knowledge (if a.ny exists). One 
exemplar of a theory is Newtonian mechanics. 
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The conventional dichotomy between 'science' and 
'social (o r behavioura l) science' is not observed, in 
kee -pine; with the view that behaviourism is not in 
principle diffe r ent from physical sciences such as 
Newtonain mechanics . That the dichotomy is usually 
founded on a l ack of famili a rity with physical sciences 
was indica ted by Popper (1966:292n44(2)) : 
"And it turns out that those who believe that 
intuitive understanding is a method peculiar 
to sciences of 'human behaviour' hold such 
views mai nly bec 8.use they cannot imag ine that a 
mathematician or a physicist c ould become so 
wel l acqtiainted wi th his object t hat h e c ould 
' get the feel of it', in the way in which a 
socioloe ist ' gets the feel' of huma n behaviour". 
The positions labelled 'Aristotelia n' and 
' Galilean' may not conform in all respects t o the views 
of Ari s totle and Galileo res pectively. The term 
'Ari s totelian' is us ed follwing Revusky (1 974: 693 ); 
t h e term ' 1alilean' is used (in place of Revusky ' s 
' Plat on ic') following Cardwel l (1 972 :36). 
In view of the diverse t o~ic s t r eated and the 
volume of the relevant lit er atur e , a c ompr ehensive 
literature review would be unwieldy . As each topic is 
r 8.is ed some of t he literature relevant t o t hat t opi c i s 
revi ewed and other relevant items are noted without 
comment. 
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